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 Abstract 
Built upon a methodological assumption that conventional theory of democracy and party politics after 
some modifications can be applied to analysing the EU politics, this article offers a case study of the 
European Green Party (EGP) by focusing on its three aspects—political programme, organisational 
structure and political participation. As the main conclusion, the author argues that the EGP has 
evolved into a Euro-party by the end of the EP’s fifth term in terms of certain standards, yet its roles as 
a system-maker for the EU’s democratic transformation are still very limited. 
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1. Introduction 
An interesting question arisen from the increasingly integrated Europe is whether there will be a 
European Union (EU) democracy based upon a European civil society or ‘political space’ to follow 
(Kohler-Koch 2003-6; Ruzza 2004:12; Ward 2004:ix). To uncover this intelligence puzzle, a commonly 
accepted research approach is to extend the conventional theory of democracy and party politics onto 
the supranational level of the EU—to examine the roles which political parties play in promoting the 
formation of a democratic European system or polity (Sweeney 1984:3-4). Following such a kind of 
‘analogical methodology’ (Haas 1970:623), this article takes the European Green Party (EGP) as an 
example to investigate whether or to what an extent the forging Euro-parties really matter in the 
context of the EU’s democratic transformation as many students may argue (Haas 1958; Marquand 
1978; Pridham and Pridham 1981; Hix and Lord 1997; Deth and Poguntke 2001-4; Hix 2006). By 
focusing on the EGP’s three aspects—political programme, organisational structure and political 
participation—as well as its main constituent parties in Western Europe, it will discuss three 
interrelated questions: How much progress has been made for the European Greens in moving 
towards a European party thus far? What are the EGP’s contributions and limitations in the 
undergoing process of transforming the EU democratically and developing a European civil society? 
And consequently, what can we reasonably expect from the interaction of the Europeanising Greens 
and an evolving European democracy in a foreseeable future? 
2. Conceptual Adaptation and Research Framework 
Before turning to the above-raised questions, let me explain or re-define a couple of key words which 
will appear often in this article. 
2.1 European democracy 
The foremost and also probably most controversial concept is ‘European democracy’. This term, in a 
singular or plural form, is usually used to describe the democratic system exercised by almost all the 
European countries today (Steiner 1998). In this article, however, it refers to the forming institutional 
complexity at the EU level or ‘the EU Polity’ constructed over the past 50 years under the inter-
governmental treaties such as the Treaty of Rome (1957), the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), the Treaty 
of Nice (2001), and the Treaty Establishing a European Constitution (2004). 
Although nobody can offer a universal definition for democracy in today’s world, any convincing 
description of or prescription to contemporary democracy must imply a systematic combination of 
certain component elements including democratic ideology or values, institutional framework and 
decision-making mechanism. Thus, being a democracy means that several political institutions are 
united into a political system or ‘polity’ basing upon and sticking to some core democratic beliefs and 
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behaviour principles. Or according to the familiar cliché, democratic governments are of, by and for the 
people. In application of this standard, the EU today arguably is a quasi-democracy (Lodge 2005:284) 
instead of a pseudo-democracy. Directly-elected European Parliament (EP) since 1979 has attained a 
lot of key check-and-balance powers in the EU’s decision-makings such as the budget approval and 
the European Commission (EC)’s formation and operation, as well as an equal legislative power in the 
policy areas to which Council of Ministers and European Council make the binding decisions by a rule 
of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) based upon the initiatives of the EC (Lodge 1996:9; Smith 1999:63; 
Kreppel 2002:89). 
It is understandable that democratisation of the EU will be a time-consuming process. The EU—
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)—came into being in 1951 primarily as a regional 
economic cooperation and integration organisation. This fact can explain why, economic growth and 
efficiency for a long time was the major, if not sole, criterion guiding the development of the EU. Other 
issues such as social rights and environmental protection were considered only under the condition 
that they were economically-related and consequently often were dealt with in an economic 
perspective. More importantly, constitutional basis for the EU was, and to a large extent still is, an 
inter-governmental cooperation mechanism based upon the ad hoc mandate-and-power-granting from 
its member states. Putting the Council of Ministers—later on plus the European Council—as the 
supreme policy-making body and maintaining a consensus rule of decision-making, member states 
could control the development of the EU and protect their key national interests. Thus, if this picture 
had remained unchanged, there would be arguably no reason to talk about the phenomenon of 
‘democratic deficits’. Yet the reality is that European integration was not restricted within the economic 
field and a lot of dramatic institutional changes have occurred with the EU, especially following the 
Single European Act in 1986 and the European Union Treaty. And as a result, democracy and 
legitimacy of the EU’s decision-making as well as itself are in question (Banchoff and Smith 1999; 
Eriksen and Fossum 2000). Retrospectively, the EU polity has indeed left far away from ‘a common 
subsystem of their members states’ (Reif 1985:1-2), if ever. As for today’s EU, it can be described as 
a mixture of representative democracy through the EP and indirective representative democracy 
through the national governments of its member states. 
2.2 Party democracy 
Another crucial word for this study is ‘party democracy’. A next-to-consensus percept in this respect is 
that it is indivisible between democracy and political parties (Schattschneider 1942; Epstein 1967; 
Sartori 1976; Budge and Keman 1990; Roskin 1991; Katz and Mair 1995), and the closest 
approximation to an ideal type in actuality is the West European democracies at the national level (Hix 
and Lord 1997:205), though one may contend by arguing that a polity with political party does not 
necessarily leads to a democracy (Müller-Rommel 2005). A detailed analysis on the relationship 
between democracy and political party, or the basic criteria measuring an ideal ‘party democracy’, is 
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beyond the scope for this article. What I want to emphasise here is that the common understandings 
above to party democracy provides us another theoretical basis for our further discussion. 
It is unthinkable that there would be a European democracy without European parties and a European 
party system. One may imagine or even find some examples of direct democracies at the community 
level, as many eco-communalists or eco-regionalists did (Sale 1985:96; Pepper 2005). As far as the 
EU—the first supranational polity in contemporary world—is concerned, however, the only conceivable 
approach to transform itself into a democratic system, in the author’s intelligence, is through 
introducing or strengthening the party competition along with interests representation among the 
European public and responsibility accountability in the European governance or the ‘EU 
Government’, no matter from where the first impetus to such a political change will come, such as the 
neo-functionalist ‘economic spillover’ (Hass 1961:369), the ambitious or rational national political 
parties (van der Eijk 1994:378-9; Hix and Lord 1997:2), or the politically-awakened ‘Eurocrats’ 
(Sweeney 1984:156), just to name a few of them. 
Thus, we can reasonably assume that political parties will become an increasingly important political 
force at the European level and act in comparable manners as they do in the national politics (Hix and 
Lord 1997:204-5). Of the key functions for political parties, they include representing the interests of 
European citizens along with the social-economic as well as other cleavage dimensions, linking the 
European civil society and ‘Eurostate’ through cohering assorted interest groups into a unitary political 
framework, recruiting European political elites for the various EU offices, providing democracy and 
legitimacy for the EU’s governance via the party competition within and outside of it, especially 
through participating in the EP elections. To fulfill these political roles, political parties in the EU 
countries have two strategic choices. The first choice is to make themselves more sensitive to the 
European issues through programmatic and organisational adjustments (Bomberg 2002), and the 
other one is to transform themselves into European or Euro-parties upon which the following section 
will discuss in-depth. 
2.3 European political party or Europeanisation of political party 
The third key concept concerning my study here is ‘European political party’ (Euro-party) or 
‘Europeanisation of political party’. Generally speaking, there are two approaches in interpreting the 
term ‘European’ or ‘Europeanisation’ (Bomberg 2002:31-2). They respectively emphasise one of the 
two aspects of European integration: the emergence and development of transnational or 
supranational political institutions at the EU level (Risse et al. 2000), and the response of political 
institutions at the national level to the EU institutions’ impacts upon member states (Ladrech 1994:69; 
Börzel 1999; Bulmer and Burch 2000:9; Hix and Goetz 2000). Both these approaches are relevant, in 
the author’s point of view, to describe and explain the evolution of political parties in the EU countries 
in the context of European integration. 
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On the one hand, ‘Euro-party’ by definition is a political party activated at the European level with 
similar organisation structure and political functions as that at the national level. Thus in the strict 
sense, a Euro-party should have a Europe-oriented political programme, a Europe-wide organisation 
structure and a EU-centred political participation. Moreover, European division-lines of political 
cleavage should replace the national interests as the major basis, along which Euro-parties are 
formed and operated., and accordingly there would have as many Euro-parties as the number of eco-
social cleavages rather than the number of member states, upon which a EU party system is 
constructed. Undoubtedly, there are rare hope to find such pattern of Euro-parties in the EU today. If 
applying these standards less stringently, however, one can easily identify several Euro-parties 
in/around the EU polity—especially in the EP politics, such as European People’s Party (EPP), Party 
of European Socialists (PES), European Liberal, Democratic and Reform Party (ELDR), and the 
EGP—successor of the European Federation of Green Party (EFGP), and so on (Hix and Lord 
1997:24; Smith 1999:84; Dietz 2000 and 2002; Kreppel 2002:177). And arguably, a European party 
system or ‘party family’ is already there or emerging (Lodge 1996:195; Hix 1999:186). 
On the other hand, political parties at the national level, as the term ‘Europeanisation of political party’ 
indicates, will play a key part in creating Euro-parties or a European party system. As a matter of fact, 
the current Euro-parties did not come from nowhere, but from a process in which all the major political 
parties in member states—both pro- and anti-European ones—have been involved. In other words, 
the formation and development of those Euro-parties appears more like a process of self-
transformation of national political parties, than creation of new ones on the EU level. This fact 
suggests that, the maturity or ‘configuration’ of Euro-parties or a European party system can only be a 
long process of evolution, which very much depends upon the function-and-power-granting of national 
political parties and the development of the EU polity as a whole (Sweeney 1984:154-8; Hix and Lord 
1997:215-8). 
‘Euro-party’ and ‘Europeanisation of political party’ thus are utilised interchangeably in this article to 
conceptualize the ongoing process of Europeanising political parties, though they can be more strictly 
differentiated to describe one of the two sides of that phenomenon separately. 
3. Research framework 
The preceding terminological analysis probably raises more questions than it may have answered, but 
upon which we can build a theoretical basis for our further discussion. The EU polity today is not a 
democracy in a strict sense of political system at the national level, and there is not any guarantee that 
it would eventually become a democracy as such (Deth 2006). Notwithstanding, it is undeniable that 
the EU has been moving towards an institutional framework with ever more democratic elements and 
is still strongly committed to be an even more democratic one (Kohler-Koch 1999; Wallström 2005). 
Thus we can safely describe the ‘European democracy’ as an ‘evolving democracy’ without a 
predetermined destination. Also, there is no unquestionable causal relationship between political party 
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and democracy including a EU democracy. Both our conventional wisdom and actual observation, 
however, point to the necessity and significance of Euro-parties for the development of a European 
democracy. Although the EU Establishments constitute an institutional skeleton which will constrain 
the operation of political parties, the latter can also, to some degree at least, reshape this polity 
through responding to it actively or even aggressively. With these general understandings to or 
believes in European political parties as the basis, we can start the case study of the EGP by focusing 
upon its roles and limitations in the context of an evolving European democracy. 
As far as the EGP is concerned, two immediate features are conspicuous. First, it is a typical Euro-
party from the outset. Most of its earliest constituent members were founded with impetus of the first 
European election in 1979, and benefited a lot from the relatively open electoral rules for the EP as 
well as its nature as a ‘second-order’ election (Reif 1985:28,98; Dietz 2000:200). Second, compared 
with other Euro-parties such as the EPP, the PES and the ELDR, it is unique in several aspects. The 
EGP is a small, ideology-oriented, and originally anti-system political party (Dietz 2000:204-5). 
On the basis of these observations and the theoretical assumptions discussed earlier, we can draw up 
a research framework for the EGP by addressing the inter-related questions: How to evaluate the 
EGP’s performance as a Euro-party in terms of its political programme, organisational structure and 
political participation? What are the roles and limitations of the EGP from a perspective of pressing the 
EU towards a democracy? And consequently, to what an extent, the EGP as well as the other Euro-
parties is an independent player in creating a EU democracy? Concretely speaking, a Europe-oriented 
political perspective is to measure whether the EGP has offered a convincing systematic explanation 
to the challenges which confront Europe today as well as the solutions to them from a Green 
perspective, especially that why should and how to make the current European integration as well as 
the EU structure more democratic; while a Europe-wide organisation structure and a EU-centred 
political participation to measure whether the EGP has the political will and capacity to successfully 
translate its political ideas into realisable political initiatives and public policy. Thus in the next two 
sections, part one will make a detailed examination of the EGP’s evolution or Europeanisation of 
green parties in the EU countries, and part two will go further to pose a theoretical analysis of why the 
EGP can only play certain political functions and in certain ways—its roles and limitations. 
Hypothesis 1: Considering its ideology-inclined and initial anti-system features, the process of the 
EGP’s transforming itself into a Euro-party would be both an ideological and a strategic one. The 
Greens’ essentially outward or global thinking probably make it easier than others to develop into a 
European-style party (Eckersley 1992; EFGP 1993a; Kelly 1994; Dobson 2000), while disagreements 
among its member parties over theoretical interpretation on and practical strategy in adapting to the 
speeding-up European integration since the mid-1980s, as many scholars have demonstrated from 
the evidence at the national level (Frankland 1992; Poguntke 1993; O`Neill 1997; Müller-Rommel and 
Poguntke 2002), would play a significant counteracting part. 
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Hypothesis 2: As a small party on the EU stage, in order to improve its participation records, the EGP 
very possibly has to increasingly adapts to the rules of European politics instead of to challenge its 
direction. If this holds true, a predictable tendency for the EGP is that it will evolve into a more 
cooperative, but less distinctive, player in the EU politics. In other words, the EGP’s potential as a 
small but imagitive political party in advocating and promoting an alternative EU will decline as the 
time goes. 
Hypothesis 3: A reasonable explanation to the EGP’s performances as a actor in promoting the EU’s 
transformation towards a true democracy more likely lies in the power configuration of European 
institutional framework as well as the structural features of the EP politics than in its internal aspects. 
To put in another way, in terms of fostering both a European democracy and a EU party system, the 
EGP is primarily a system-adapter than a system-maker. 
4. Evaluating the EGP as a European Party 
As having been prescribed in the foregoing section, a fully-fledged European party should have its 
Europe-relevant political perspective, organisation structure and political participation. There is no 
exception for the Greens. Thus this part will concentrate upon the three dimensions of the EGP to 
measure whether or to what an extent it has developed into a Euro-party. 
4.1 Programmatic dimension 
One key requirement for a European party is a set of Europe-oriented political perspectives. As for the 
EGP, four variables will be examined in the next analysis of its programmatic documents—the five 
common manifestos for European elections (1984-2004) and the Guiding Principles of European 
Federation of Green Parties (EFGP 1993a). They include a distinctive Green vision of Europe, a clear 
and unitary policy on European integration, a systematic criticism on and reform suggestions to the 
EU, and a realistic and constructive political strategy. 
Attempts to draw up a common statement of ‘Green Europe’ started with the Coordination of 
European Green and Radical Parties which was set up around the EP election of 1979. Yet there were 
insurmountable disagreements among the Greens, especially between the radical-leftist and the purist 
ones (Bomberg 1998:72). As a result, the EGP had no official pan-European platform in the first 
European election. 
In the Joint Declaration of the European Green Parties and the Paris Declaration issued before the 
1984 EP election, the EGP—the reconstructed ‘European Green Coordination’ or ‘European 
Greens’—for the first time conceptualised its basic percepts and policy positions in common on 
Europe (see Parkin 1989:327-30). In these short documents the Greens criticised the unecological 
reality and centralised power structure in economy as well as in society, and demanded for a 
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reconstruction of the relationship between the human race and the rest of nature, and between the 
rich and the poor, by highlighting the policies such as peace and defense, agriculture, anti-nuclear 
energy, sustainable economy, women and human rights, and Third World. Rather than supporting for 
European integration, it advocated a federal structure consisting of regions, instead of nation states, 
within which diversity will be taken into account and highly respected. In its own words, Europe is ‘a 
new Europe, neutral and decentralised, with autonomous regions’ (EGP 1984:1). By doing so, the 
EGP presented a contending model of Europe—‘Europe of regions’ based on the principles of 
ecologism and regionalism (Dietz 2000: 205; Ruzza 2004:119). And unsurprisingly, both the EU and 
European integration were even not mentioned, though there was a strong anti-EU flavour in them. 
Around the 1989 EP election, some of the EGP’s member parties started shifting towards a position of 
more pro-parliamentary participation and pro-European integration, yet the majority of them like the 
French Greens maintained an attitude which was criticised by Brice Lalonde, Environmental Minister 
at that time, as anti-Europeanism. Besides the obvious themes of environmental protection, energy 
resources, the quality of life and anti-nuclearism, it urged solidarity with the Third World, the regions, 
the unemployed, the young and the old, and expressed strong reservations about the Single European 
Market (SEM), fearing that free-market profiteering would outweigh the social and environmental 
dimensions. These rhetorics can be easily found from the EGP’s second common manifesto. In a 8-
page long text, the Greens addressed its main policy positions on sustainable economy, international 
solidarity, environment protection, renewable energy, public transport, anti-biotechnology, organic 
agriculture, women and men equality, shared and flexible work, human rights, disarmament and 
dismilitarisation. This manifesto to a large degree is a mixture of the two declarations issued in 1984. 
Its vision on sustainable development is a very green version. ‘Greens are committed to a radical 
sharing of wealth—between continents and between generations, not only between classes. This 
means shifting economic priorities from consumption to conservation; away from the self-defeating 
economic growth of the Single Market and towards sustainable regional economies’ (EGP 1989:3). At 
the same time, a regionalist view of Europe still features it. ‘We European Greens ultimately envisage 
a new concept for Europe: a Europe of autonomous regions without any borders’ (EGP 1989:1). With 
a strong belief that ‘the small is beautiful’, the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), the SEM, the EEC, 
the EU, the EU enlargement, and the EP were mentioned for several times, but all that in a negative 
sense. Furthermore, this platform claimed that the Greens ‘acutely aware that the EEC institutions are 
deeply undemocratic’, and one of its major missions ‘is to promote the democratisation of all 
institutions with our Green vision of Europe’ (EGP 1989:1). In terms of this, there is no substantial 
difference between this document and that of 1984. 
The Guiding Principles of European Federation of Green Parties adopted at the founding congress of 
the EFGP in 1993 has been thus far functioning as the EGP’s basic programme. This document 
consists of three parts: ecological development, common security and new citizenship. Under section 
one, it explained the EGP’ major policies on ecological economy, world economy and European 
economy, advocating a smooth conversion of current economic structure and world economic system. 
In part two, it generalised the Greens’ new understanding of peace maintaining and creation in a post-
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Cold War era, stressing that ‘peace is indivisible and should be organised’, and that these goals could 
be achieved through creating a new European security system, disarming, and reforming the United 
Nations. In the third section, it emphasised that human rights should be expanded and better 
protected, especially for women, the minorities and other societal groups in a weak social position. 
With having always claimed to be a European rather than a EU political party (Lippelt 2004), there was 
no discussion in this document regarding the newly established EU as well as the speeding-up 
European integration. Nevertheless, a clear sign for the EGP’s reorientation is it only mentioned ‘a 
Europe of regions’ one time, indicating that this theme was being marginalised within the Greens. 
The 1994 electoral manifesto titled Electoral Platform of the Green Parties of the European Union 
reflected both the EGP’s progress and limitation of green conceptualisation. This document differs 
significantly from the Greens’ earlier common statements. It was more comprehensive and detailed 
with a text as long as 37 pages, and much less ideology-inclined. This platform placed greater 
emphasis on pragmatic alternatives to the EU’s policies of agriculture, transportation, environment, 
energy, industry, research and development, economic and social cohesion, internal market, 
international trade, production and consumption, cooperation with Third World countries, eliminating 
social exclusion, monetary policy, European citizenship, gender equality, and common security. 
Furthermore, it demonstrated that the EGP has dramatically reoriented its policy attitude towards the 
EU in general and the role of the EP within it in particular. For instance it openly declared that ‘the 
Greens are in favour of European integration. The European Union—despite all the well-deserved 
criticism, and even if it cannot accomplish pan-European integration on its own—will be an important 
factor in this process. The four key concepts of the needed reform are: a pan-European approach, 
democracy, social ecology and decentralisation’ (EGP 1994:29). In addition, to change the EU’s 
structures, objectives, policies and tools with a green perspective, it insisted that ‘the European 
Parliament constitutes with the council the legislative and budgetary authority of the European Union. 
The Parliament must have power to initiate legislation, as well as the power of political control over the 
Commission’ (EGP 1994:30). It is quite evident that the EGP has adopted a realistic political approach 
of ‘reforming the EU from inside’ which puts the EP as the major legitimate channel of institutional 
participation. As a result, this document appeared more like a ‘guidebook’ for the next EGP group in 
the EP than a reiteration of the Greens’ political precepts and policy views (Bomberg 1998:78). 
Consequently, the vision of ‘Europe of regions’ was virtually absent, receiving only a brief paragraph 
near the end of the text. In short, it seems that the EGP has shifted its focus from constructing and 
promoting an alternative vision of Europe to formulating some achievable policy initiatives on the EU 
political stage. 
Green Strategy for the 1999 European Elections adopted by the second congress of the EFGP is a 
relative short document, with more clearly-defined or professional policy emphasis and generalization 
(EGP 1999). In this platform, it stressed that the Greens is devoted to challenge the current direction 
of the EU—reflecting the hegemony of transnational capital, maintaining the undemocratic structure 
and damaging the environment and social cohesion, and demands political changes in order to 
achieve environmentally and socially sustainable development. For this, the Greens is committed to 
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working for minimum environmental and social regulations at all levels of economic decision-making to 
ensure reconciliation between the economy, the environment and the European social model, realising 
a series of environment protection goals such as reducing the CO2 emission and the replacement of 
nuclear power by safe and renewable energy sources, promoting institutional reform of the EU to allow 
for a more efficient and transparent policy process, advocating an expanded European citizenship to 
better protect the fundamental human rights who live in the EU, and extending the EP’s powers of co-
decision to increase the democracy of the EU. To cite its own words, the Green project is to ‘build a 
society respectful of fundamental rights and environmental justice’, to ‘increase freedom within the 
world of work’, and to ‘deepen democracy by decentralisation and direct participation of people in 
decision-making that concerns them’; the Green method is ‘radical, realistic and reformist’; the Green 
values are ‘solidarity, innovation, independence and openness’ (EGP 1999:3). All these statements 
suggest that the EGP has evolved from a protest-motivated, movement-style party into a parliament-
oriented, professional one. 
The EGP’s common manifesto for the 2004 European election is in fact only a ‘Common Preamble’ 
(EGP 2004a). This brief platform includes two parts. In part one it summarised the Greens’ major 
positions towards the EU and European integration. As it said, the Greens supports ‘a more tolerant, 
social, ecological and democratic Union’ and a reuniting Europe in which the EU plays a leading part. 
To achieve these, the EGP is in favour of the EU’s fair enlargement, an independent and cohesive 
European foreign policy, and the new EU constitutional treaty. Environmental protection as well as 
other green policies were also addressed, but its emphasis was obviously put on the EU’s expanding 
and extending responsibilities. Thus, a clear message from this document is no longer a Green vision 
on Europe, rather a green vision of the EU. Part two briefly discussed the Greens’ key policy goals 
such as safeguarding the environment (safe, healthy and tasty food, shift in energy policy), greening 
the social dimension (strong communities and livable cities with social and economic security for all 
European citizens), developing democracy (strong citizen empowerment, equal civil and political rights 
for all citizens), strengthening the peace policy (multilateralism and disarmament, international 
solidarity and cooperation, conflict prevention and mediation), and promoting grass roots globalisation 
(Tobin tax for the developed countries, corporate responsibility). These policy suggestions reflected 
the EGP’s continuous efforts in broadening its political image from a single-issued environmental party 
to a more comprehensive leftist party. Nevertheless, it seems that not all the EGP’s member parties 
could accept such a generally pro-EU and leftist position in their electoral campaigns without difficulty, 
and this is probably the reason why the EGP did not formulate another unitary common manifesto. 
In terms of the EGP’s programmatic development, as table 1 shows, there has undergone a process 
of transition during the past two decades from stressing an alternative vision of Europe—a Green 
Europe or Europe of regions—to the greening of an ever integrating or reuniting Europe. Accordingly, 
the EGP is gradually giving up its radical, often vague and inconsistent, Green thinking on Europe and 
taking an increasingly pro-EU or constructive policy attitude towards European integration and the EU. 
Of the major turning points, the EFGP issued a statement for the first time in 1994 calling on the 
European Council to reform the EU in the interests of ‘democracy’ and ‘peace’, and to protect the 
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environment and reduce unemployment. Therefore, similar with what have occurred to the Greens in 
domestic politics, the EGP is getting to be an ideologically distinctive but normal political party at the 
European level. 
Table 1: Programmatic dimension of the EGP in the European parliamentary terms (1979-2004) 
 1984 1989 1993 1994 1999 2004 
Green vision 
on Europe* 
+ + + +/- +/- -/+ 
Policy on 
European 
integration** 
- - - +/- +/- + 
EU-reform 
suggestion*** 
- -/+ -- +/- +/- +/- 
Realistic political 
strategy**** 
- - -/+ +/- +/- +/- 
* + indicating an alternative vision of Europe such as ‘Green Europe’ or ‘Europe of Regions’ 
** + indicating a supportive attitude towards European integration 
*** + indicating a constructive position towards the EU 
**** + indicating an accepting attitude towards parliamentary participation 
4.2 Organisational structure dimension 
Another key aspect for a European political party is a Europe-wide organisation structure. For the 
EGP, a four-variable-framework is applied in the following investigation which will focus upon its 
organisational development surrounding the European elections and the EP participations. They 
include a well-organised party federation organisation, a strengthening EP parliamentary group, a 
streamlined relationship between the federation and its members parties, a close-cooperative 
relationship between the EGP’s party office and parliamentary branch. 
The earliest attempts to form a Europe-wide organisation of green parties were made in 1979 around 
the European election (Dietz 2000:200). The Greens from Belgium, France, Germany, the UK, 
together with two radical parties of the Netherlands and Italy, set up a network-style organisation: the 
Coordination of European Green and Radical Parties with a secretariat provided by the Dutch radicals 
who had members of parliament. On 31 March-1 April 1984, a first European congress of Green 
parties was held in Liege, Belgium. At that congress, the Green group renamed itself to be ‘European 
Green Coordination’ or ‘the European Greens’ and formally created a secretariat of four co-secretaries 
(Janssens 2004). Of its major achievements, it issued the Joint Declaration of the European Green 
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Parties in January and the Paris Declaration in April 1984, and the latter document was accepted as 
the EGP’s first common manifesto for the 1984 European election. Thus, during the EP’s first term, the 
EGP was at best a cooperation network for its member parties, serving them to exchange their green 
ideas and policy demands as well as campaign skills. And unsurprisingly, any decision made by the 
Green Coordination had no binding power to its member parties at the national level. By contrast, 
most of the Green leaders including the German Greens concentrated on the task of building up 
national parties or attempting to resolve internal disputes, thus having neglected the issue of Europe 
or ‘Europolitics’ (Gahrton 2004). 
In preparation for the 1984 European election, the Green Coordination decided to draft a joint 
declaration as a common manifesto. The primary motivation to do so, as it recognised, was to 
‘conform with the regulations of the European Parliament for the purpose of the funds destined for 
reimbursement of the expense of political groups’ (EGP 1984). In other words, its primary aim was 
confined to be ‘a technical alliance’. With entry into the EP of 11 elected MEPs, however, the EGP 
formed a green faction named ‘Green Alternative European Link’ (GRAEL) within a larger ‘Rainbow 
Group’. In the EP’s second term, the ‘European Coordination of Green Parties’ (ECGP) —a formal 
name for the European Green Coordination after the 1984 EP election—remained to be a loosely 
connected transnational collection. The ECGP had only one decision-making organ: the twice-yearly 
Meeting of Green Coordination, and a biannual congress was held. At the same time, the GRAEL was 
an ideologically and strategically diverse party group plagued with numerous internal disputes over the 
desirability, aims and means of parliamentary participation. Furthermore, to promote internal 
democracy and grassroots control, the GRAEL’s organisational structure was purposefully kept loose 
and non-conformist, and several specific measures were taken to encourage wide and equal 
participation (Bomberg 1998:105). Nevertheless, the EGP’s first triangular power configuration of ‘the 
ECGP-the GRAEL-member parties’ was formed and the parliamentary branch rose immediately to be 
the most powerful representative at the EU level, though it did take the Paris Declaration as its political 
guideline. 
Dramatic change of the composition of Green MEPs after the 1989 European election as well as 
political differences within the Rainbow Group resulted in the Green Coordination to form its own party 
group in the new EP, the Green Group in European Parliament (GGEP I). Being an independent 
group, the GGEP improved very rapidly its ideological homogeneity and strategic cohesion in 
parliamentary participation. By the mid-term, the GGEP members have been deeply entrenched in the 
EP’s parliamentary committee structure and held the chair or vice-chairs of five committees. About the 
same time, the ECGP reorganised itself into the EFGP in 1993, enhancing the EGP from a party 
confederation to a party federation. According to its statutes, the EFGP is to ‘ensure a close and 
permanent co-operation among member parties in order to accomplish the common policy, laid out by 
the Congress’, to ‘stimulate and organise initiatives and activities on a European level under the 
supervision of the Council and the Committee’, to ‘ensure a close cooperation and organise initiatives 
between the Federation and the Green group in the European Parliament’ (EFGP 1993b). Thus, the 
third EP term was a significant period of transition for the EGP. Both internal organisation structure of 
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parliamentary branch and party federation and the relationship between them have changed 
dramatically. On the one hand, the EGP federation has established a streamlined organisation 
structure composed of the Congress, the Council, and the Federation Committee (Executive Board). 
On the other hand, the Green parliamentary group has been incorporated into the EP’s institutional 
structure. As far as the internal power structure is concerned, the first triangle was replaced by a new 
one, ‘the EFGP-the GGEP-member parties’. Under the new power configuration, according to the 
EGP’s statutes, ‘the Federation gives (Green Group) the power to represent it politically in the 
European parliament’, while ‘the member parties shall maintain their name, identity and autonomy of 
acting within the scope of their national and regional responsibilities’. Thus the EGP appears very 
close to a Euro-party, with the EFGP as the major representative of green parties at European level 
and holding a politically supervisory status over the GGEP. 
The EGP’s this organisational structure remained unchanged and was consolidated after the 1994 EP 
election. The GGEP was renewed with only a minor change of size, being the GGEP II. Compared 
with its predecessors, the GGEP II continued with the process of softening its radical grassroots 
structure in order to streamline its operations. Most of the Green MEPs have implicitly accepted the 
basic parliamentary ‘rules of the game’ and tried hard to exploit the opportunities provided by the EP 
membership, though there were still some important exceptions (Bomberg 1998:119). For the EFGP, it 
held its first two congresses in 1996 and in 1999. At the second congress in Paris, it adopted a 
common manifesto for the run-up European election. 
Several profound changes occurred with the EGP following the European election in 1999. The EGP 
formed a new party group with the European Free Alliance (EFA)—a political alliance of regional 
parties, the European Greens/EFA. In fact, they have worked together in the Rainbow Group and 
partly in the GGEP I. Thus, this political formula was not really new for both sides. It needs to point 
out, though, this new group can not be simplistically regarded as a revival of the Rainbow Group, a 
backward development. The EGP enjoyed a dominant position in this group, numerically and 
politically. Moreover, the Greens has become a mature or professional parliamentary party, 
familiarising with all the working procedures of the EP and having a cooperative mentality, to play such 
a leading role. On the other side, the EFGP held its third congress in May 2002, on which the author 
has observed, a very well-organised event. More significantly, reconstructing the EFGP into a Euro-
party was successfully realised at its fourth and the last congress held in February 2004. Among the 
other effects, this brought about the EGP’s third and the current triangle of power structure—‘the EGP-
the European Greens-member parties’. Theoretically, this would lead to a better-organised party 
federation body, a more equal relationship between the EGP and its party members, and a stronger 
party control over the parliamentary group. According to its annual reports, there was more mutual 
collaborations or commonly hosted activities among the EGP, the GGEP and the national green 
parties during 2004-5 (EGP 2004b). And my observation on the 2006 Länderrat of the German Greens 
in Mainz also confirmed, to some degree at least, these expectations. ‘EGP-Council in Helsinki’ is one 
of the five main issues scheduled for that convention, and two of its 13 MEPs participated in it. 
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Table 2: Organisational dimension of the EGP in the European election terms(1979-2004) 
 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 
Party 
federation 
organs* 
- - -/+ +/- +/- + 
Parliamentary 
group** - - -/+ +/- + + 
EGP and 
member 
parties*** 
- - - - - -/+ 
Party office 
and GGEP**** - - - -/+ -/+ +/- 
* + indicating a better-organised organisational structure of the EGP federation 
** + indicating a stronger Green group in terms of its professionalisation and cooperative strategy 
*** + indicating a close to equal relation between the EGP and member parties 
**** + indicating a strong control of the party office over the Green group 
As table 2 shows, the EGP has developed into a Euro-party with increasingly better-organised 
federation organisation and ever more professional parliamentary group during the previous five EP 
terms. It is also obvious, though, that the EGP is an organisationally weak party. Most significantly, the 
EGP federation lacks both the necessary political authority over its component parts and the 
supervisory capacity over its parliamentary branch. In this sense, the EGP is still a transnational party 
federation rather than a supranational unitary party (Dietz 2000:208; 2002:130). 
4.3 Political participation dimension 
Although one may claim that Euro-parties play a powerful part in all the major EU institutions such as 
the EP, the EC, Council of Ministers and European Council (Hix and Lord 1997:1-7; Hix 2006), the 
EGP is mainly an EP-centred European party for two reasons. First, the EGP is a small party both at 
the national and European levels. That means, only in exceptional cases, its member parties can join 
the national governments and consequently have a voice in the Councils and the EC. Yet it did have 
occurred when the Finnish, Italian, French, German and Belgian Greens were in national governments 
during 1995-2005 (Müller-Rommel and Poguntke 2002; Bomberg 2002:39). Second, the EGP is an 
ideology-inclined party. Most of its political leaders and MEPs believe in the principle of parliamentary 
democracy and put their political trust in increasing the power of the EP instead of the other EU 
institutions. Therefore, my investigation into the EGP’s political participation here will concentrate upon 
that in the EP politics. On a basis of this, three variables including electoral political participation 
(common manifesto, EU-wide campaign, prestigious EP candidates), parliamentary representation 
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participation (votes, seats, committee members) and parliamentary policy-making participation 
(average voting rate, party group cohesion, impacts on the significant EU-decisions) will be examined. 
Member parties of the EGP at their founding stage participated in the first European election in 1979 
(Reif 1985). They run some unprofessional and inexpensive campaigns, and received 2.42% of the 
vote, 3.02% of the EU-wide (Reif 1985:197), but without seat. The breakdown of national votes was as 
follows: Belgium (3.4%), France (4.4%), Germany (3.2%), Luxembourg (1.0%) and the UK (0.1%). 
There has been accordingly no formal parliamentary participation for the EGP during the EP’s first 
term. Yet the French Greens did introduce three cases in the European Court in relation with the EP’s 
arrangements for the 1984 European election to fund the Euro-parties’ information campaign and to 
reimburse their election expenses (Corbett 1995:24). 
In 1984, with its three constituent members (the Belgian, German and Finnish Greens) entry into 
national parliaments, the EGP organised a more unified and professional European campaign under a 
common manifesto (Lodge 1986; Bomberg 1998:87-91). The Belgian Greens went to the polls with 
pro-European programmes. They said, Europe is needed to tackle environmental problems, but the 
current Europe of merchants has to be transformed into a Europe of people. They also advocated 
treating problems on a smaller scale, more democracy, a dramatic cut in working week, redistribution 
of wealth, peace and a new conception of development aid. Their posters did not show their 
candidates but the tree of life stifling a missile (AGALEV) and a globe with the words ‘there is only one’ 
(Ecolo). The German Greens selected their candidates at the Karlsruhe convention of 1984. The 
incumbent MEP Friedrich Wilhelm Graefe zu Baringdorf, not a member of the Green Party at that time, 
was nominated as the top candidate. At the same conference, the principle of rotation was adopted by 
a vote of 437 to 347. During the campaign, the German Greens introduced a rather more critical 
perspective on the EU. They criticised the CAP and opposed the EU’s development into a 
superpower. Like other green parties it also stressed the need for equal opportunities for women and 
committed the party to defending the consumer in the CAP. Its strategy was encapsulated in the title 
of the campaign booklet: ‘Think globally, act locally!’. More noteworthily, while the French Greens had 
to seek the help of a solidarity contribution provided by the Belgian and German Greens for their 
election, the German Green Party ‘earned’ 16.8 million DM by running a cheap campaign (costing only 
1 million DM). As the result, the EGP received 4.25% of the vote and 11 seats. The breakdown of 
national votes and seats was as follows: Belgium (8.2% 2 seats), France (3.4%), Germany (8.2% 7 
seats), Ireland (0.5%), Luxembourg (6.1%), the Netherlands (6.9% 2 seats), Spain (0.6%), and the UK 
(0.1%). 
In the wake of election, the EGP formed a Rainbow Group together with the EFA and the Danish Anti-
EC Movement. With 20 members it was the second smallest of the eight EP groups. Within the 
Rainbow Group, the GRAEL as a sub-group was set up to represent green issues, and took the Paris 
Declaration as its common platform. An organisationally heterogeneous party group as such, along 
with internal conflicts within the GRAEL caused by national, ideological and strategic differences, 
made the Green MEPs were either unwilling or unable to agree on a coherent set of Euro-political 
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goals and strategy or policy initiatives before the EP, let alone to change the EU politics. For instance, 
the GRAEL had no unitary position on EU enlargement in 1986 (accession of Spain and Portugal), put 
in contradictory votes on resolutions concerning increased competence for the EC, and disagreed on 
a common position towards the Single European Act (Bomburg 1998:107-9). 
In several senses the 1989 election to the EP was a Green one, if not a European one (Lodge 1990:1; 
van der Eijk and Franklin 1994:275; Bomburg 1998:91-5). All the EGP’s constituent parts benefited 
from the arising saliency of environmental issue in electoral politics and run successful campaigns, 
increasing their share of votes and/or the seats. The united French Greens presented itself in the 
campaign as both an environmentally-oriented and a well-institutionalised party, attacking the 
‘productivist’ logic of left and right and espousing the values of ‘cultural liberalism’. By so doing, it 
attracted a lot of switching voters and became one of the biggest winners. Meanwhile, the UK Greens 
fully exploited the favourabe political situation during the campaign, to some degree even promoted by 
the Conservative Mrs Thatcher, and created a historical record for the Greens in supranational 
elections by winning 14.9% of the vote, though it failed to receive any seat in the EP mainly because 
of the discriminating electoral system. In addition, if the Greens in Luxembourg, Greece and Spain 
were united rather than dividing into 2, 3 and 4 separate lists, they would win at least one seat in the 
EP respectively with the total votes of 10.4%, 2.6% and 2.7%. In the end, the EGP received 7.39% of 
the vote, excluding the Danish and Portuguese Greens who formed alliances with other larger parties, 
and 26 seats. The breakdown of national votes and seats was as follows: Belgium (13.9% 3 seats), 
France (10.6% 9 seats but one MEP left after the election), Germany (8.4% 8 seats), Greece (1.1%), 
Ireland (3.7%), Italy (3.8% 3 seats), Luxembourg (10.4%), the Netherlands (7.0% 2 seats), Spain 
(1.1%), and the UK (14.9%). 
Following with the defunct of the GRAEL shortly after the election, the GGEP as an independent group 
in the EP was formed on 25 July 1989. At its conception, the GGEP consisted of 30 MEPs and was 
the fifth largest of ten EP political groups. Other than the 25 elected EGP members, it also included 
two Rainbow Greens from Italy, three ‘Non-green’ members from Italy (2) and Spain (1). Unlike the 
GRAEL, first, the GGEP was much more ‘a political rather than technical group’. The principles laid 
out in the ‘Common Statement of the European Greens’ were its political guideline. That implies, the 
GGEP was a more politically homogeneous group than the GRAEL. Second, the GGEP was a party 
group on its own in the EP. Moreover, both parliamentary participation experience and the logic of 
parliamentary politics made the GGEP MEPs learn quickly, recognising the necessity of adapting 
Green ideas to the reality and shifting to a more accepting attitude towards the EP. Nevertheless, 
internal conflicts in relation to national, ideological and strategic differences were not resolved with the 
electoral victory (Bomberg 1998:111-7). This is partly because, compared with the German-dominated 
GRAEL, the GGEP was clearly a ‘Mediterranean-led’ group. Some Green MEPs from this region 
maintained a distinctive understanding of their missions in the EP, such as practising ‘a constant 
pedagogy of political ecology’. In short, the EGP’s increased popular support and parliamentary 
representation improved the general image of the GGEP and made the Green voice louder than 
before in the EP’s certain committees such as Energy, Research and Technology (5), Environment, 
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Public Health and Consumer Protection (4), and Agriculture, Fishery and Rural Development (3), but 
this did not bring about much progress towards the ‘greening’ of the EU. 
The 1994 European election took place under a dramatically changed circumstances in which 
employment, competitiveness and institutional change were the top issues (Lodge 1996:189; Bomberg 
1998:95). Confronting with this new situation, the EGP issued a common manifesto indicating that it 
would play a more constructive role in EP politics, but proved to be unable to formulate an appropriate 
electoral strategy and keep the attractiveness of its green ideas. The Dutch Greens chose to heavily 
attack the market-oriented approach of the EU, the concepts of Monetary Union and a European 
Central Bank—seen as exponents of ‘big finance’—and the secrecy of European decision-making, 
while the French Greens—in part owing to the different attitudes towards cooperation with the 
government—decided to draw up two separate lists, not united as that in 1989. Therefore, most of the 
EGP’s component parts did not fare well. The only exception was the German and the Irish Greens. 
For the former, strategic adjustments since the defeat in 1990 federal election, the context of a ‘super-
electionyear’ (Superwahljahr), and more politicised nature of the Greens’ supporters, all these factors 
were conducive to achieve an unprecedented success at the national level. For the latter, 
environmental issue played a major part in mobilising the voters of the Greens. In eastern side of the 
country, there was a broadly based concern about the deteriorating quality of life in urban areas and a 
specific concern over nuclear waste being dumped in the Irish Sea off the British coast. During the 
campaign, how to use the EU institution and legislation to tackle the problem of nuclear pollution 
became a hot topic, and the Greens benefited from it most. As the result, the EGP received 5.67% of 
the vote, excluding the Danish and Portuguese Greens who once again joined alliances with other 
larger parties, and 21 seats. The breakdown of national votes and seats was as follows: Belgium 
(11.5% 2 seats), France (3.0%), Germany (10.1% 12 seats), Greece (0.3%) Ireland (7.9% 2 seats), 
Italy (3.2% 3 seats) Luxembourg (10.9% 1 seat), the Netherlands (6.2% 1 seat), Spain (0.68%), and 
the UK (3.2%). 
After this election, the 21 elected EGP MEPs together with one regionalist from Italy and one left 
Greens from Denmark formed the GGEP II, which ranked as the sixth of nine groups in the EP. Similar 
with the GGEP I, the GGEP II was a very politically homogeneous group, and obviously, a German-led 
one. But, unlike the GGEP I, it had a much weaker position in the EP. Quite interestingly, however, the 
GGEP II still took part in 18 committees and received 4 chair or vice chairs, reflecting the increased 
influence of Green MEPs in the EP. With the EU’s enlargement on 1 January 1995, it got three new 
MEPs from Austria, Finland and Sweden, and another three additional MEPs after the Swedish 
election to the EP in September 1995. By the end of this EP term, the GGEP II had 27 members and 
maintained its status as the sixth largest group. During this term, the GGEP speeded up its process of 
transition to a parliamentary party. Green MEPs have officially reconciled themselves to working within 
the EP and have actively sought participation in it. This made the GGEP II pay more attention to 
conceptual and institutional issues regarding the EU than either previous group. However, strategic 
differences over the attitudes towards the EP participation and the EU institutions did not eliminate, 
and on the contrary these were exacerbated following the joining of the Swedish Greens. This defect 
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thus has to a great degree affected the implementation of the EGP’s new strategy—to reform the EU 
‘from within’ (Bomberg 1998:101). For example, discussions concerning the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) and the Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) uncovered major schisms in the 
group regarding the desirability of a federal Europe. A clear divide emerged between the EGP MEPs 
led by the Italians and some Germans, and those by the Swedish. 
The 1999 election to the EP was a spectacular success for the EGP as far as the electoral result is 
concerned (Lodge 2001). Of the four member parties in national governments, the Finnish, the Italian 
and the French Greens survived the challenges as a junior coalition partner, especially the Kosovo 
crisis, and maintained their popular support. The German Greens was an exception. Many of its 
pacifist grassroots members actually refused to campaign in protest against Germany’s participation in 
the conflict. As a result, the German Greens paid dearly for its failure to deliver in government and for 
its support for the war in Kosovo, losing over half of its voters compared with the last European 
election. As for the three new comers—the Austrian, the Finnish and the Swedish Greens, all of them 
organised an effective campaign through pursuing different electoral strategies. For the Austrian 
Greens, its programme focused upon environmental issues and social policy. It campaigned against 
the use of automatic energy, genetic engineering of food and the use of genetically manipulated 
products in agriculture. It favoured public over private transport and demanded the democratisation 
and constitutionalisation of the EU treaties. During the campaign, the Finnish Greens emphasised that 
environmental and social policies should become central areas of the EU. Its leading candidate, Heidi 
Hautala, constantly spoken against the financial malpractices of the EP, and the secrecy surrounding 
the Council. The Swedish Greens maintained its attitude against the EU membership by arguing for 
holding another referendum to decide whether Sweden should quit from the EU. In addition, both the 
Belgian and the Dutch Greens made great gains. The former benefited from the dioxin crisis broken 
just before the election, while the latter from its clear role in opposition in the national parliament, 
strong party leadership and relatively critical attitude towards Europe. In the end, the EGP received 
7.72% of the vote, excluding the Danish and Portuguese Greens by the same token as mentioned 
earlier, and 38 seats. The breakdown of national votes and seats was as follows: Austria (9.3% 2 
seats), Belgium (15.8% 5 seats), Finland (13.4% 2 seats), France (9.8% 9 seats), Germany (6.4% 7 
seats), Greece (0.5%) Ireland (6.7% 2 seats), Italy (1.8% 2 seats) Luxembourg (10.7% 1 seat), the 
Netherlands (11.9% 4 seat), Spain (1.4%), Sweden (9.5% 2 seats), and the UK (5.5% 2 seats). 
In the wake of this election, the Green MEPs managed to form a new group ‘the European 
Greens/EFA’ with 10 MEPs from Basque, Flemish, Scottish, Welsh, and Spanish regionalist parties. 
As such, ‘the Greens/EFA’ was the fourth largest of seven groups in the EP’s fifth term. There is no 
doubt that the Greens played a dominant role within this group, which took its common manifesto as 
the guideline. Nevertheless, this group to some degree was a revival of the Rainbow Group and the 
GGEP I which also included several regionalist MEPs, and the new title for the group implied that the 
regionalist MEPs would have a stronger role within it. At the beginning, the EGP MEPs participated 17 
committees and received 4 chair or vice chairs, without substantive change compared with that in 
1994. The Green MEPs disproportionally concentrated in the committees such as Industry and Extern 
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Trade (5), Environment and Public Health (5), Foreign Affairs and Human Rights (5). In theory the 
Greens would play an more influential role in those policy areas, for example regarding the EU-China 
relation, while in practice it is very difficult to differentiate its own impacts from the big party groups 
(Hix 2006). 
In terms of electoral issues and campaign organisation, the 2004 EP election for the EGP was the 
most European one, though the result obtained by it can not be considered as satisfactory overall 
(Lodge 2005; EGP 2004b). The common manifesto was widely accepted by its member parties, and 
several Green leaders campaigned across national borders. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the EGP’s co-chair 
of the EP group, visited about two thirds of the EU countries in less than two months. In Belgium, the 
Groen!—a new name of reconstructed Flemish Greens—concentrated upon its EP list leader Bart 
Staes, who had excellent work records in the EP, with a single slogan for both the European and the 
regional elections: ‘Groen! is searching for 280,000 votes’, while the Ecolo—its francophone 
counterpart—also placed its relatively unknown MEP Pierre Jonckheer in charge of its European list, 
followed by the party heavyweight Isabelle Durant. The Finnish Greens, other than placing its former 
party leader and minister for environment as the top candidate, used the EGP’s manifesto in its 
campaign and mainly campaigned in favour of putting the Constitution to a referendum, which were 
different from the other political parties. The French Greens supported the draft EU Constitution and 
democratic representation organised on an EU-wide level. Its campaign was run in close conjunction 
with the EGP by using its logo as well as the slogan common to the green parties throughout the 
member states. The German Greens chose a dual leadership for the election consisting of the 
generally invisible Rebecca Harms and the somewhat better-known former Franco-German 
revolutionary Daniel Cohn-Bendit, and unlike other parties, run its campaign under the banner of the 
supranational EGP. The Irish Greens drew attention to the environmental and social objectives of the 
EU’s Lisbon Strategy, argued that ‘issues like social justice and environmental protection go hand in 
hand and must not take second place to the single pursuit of competitiveness’, and supported the 
Constitution in principle but deplored the ‘militarisation’ of the EU. For the Luxembourg Greens, it was 
the only party to get financial and technical support from a Euro-party, the EGP. Its TV spots were 
similar to those of the Austrian and the German Greens, and were devised by its German advertising 
agency. In the newcomer states, the Cyprus Greens’ web page exhibited technical sophistication and 
even preoccupation with European concerns. ‘How we see Europe and what we will claim in the 
European Parliament’ emphasised almost exclusively the Green Agenda and the European Greens’ 
values and worldview, to the point that ‘the Cyprus content’ seemed suppressed. The Maltese Greens 
focused much of its attention on the personal credentials of the candidate—Arnold Cassola—as a 
long-serving member of the EGP. With the slogan ‘For the country, not for the party’, the Greens 
hoped to capture the votes of all those dissatisfied with both major parties, repeatedly calling for a 
break with Malta’s traditional two-party system. While emphasising the European Greens’ 
environmental record, the Maltese Greens downplayed the EGP’s general manifesto and its own 
commitment to divorce. As the result, the EGP received 7.28% of the vote, excluding the Danish and 
the Portuguese Greens as well as their counterparts in the ten new EU members, and 33 seats. The 
breakdown of national votes and seats was as follows: Austria (12.9% 2 seats), Belgium (8.6% 2 
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seats), Finland (10.4% 1 seat), France (8.4% 6 seats), Germany (11.9% 13 seats), Greece (0.7%) 
Ireland (4.3%), Italy (2.5% 2 seats) Luxembourg (15.02% 1 seat), the Netherlands (7.4% 2 seats), 
Spain (1.7% 1 seat), Sweden (5.9% 1 seat), and the UK (6.06% 2 seats). 
‘The Greens/EFA’ as an EP party group was renewed without change after the election. With 42 
MEPs in total, of it 35 Greens, this group is a little smaller in size than that between 1999 and 2004, 
but maintaining its status as the fourth largest of seven EP groups. For the EGP MEPs, they 
participated 20 committees and received 5 chair or vice chairs, concentrating on those committees 
such as Environment and Public Health (4), Foreign Affairs and Human Rights (3), Industry and 
Research (3), and Employment and Social Affairs (3). 
To summarise, as table 3 demonstrates, the EGP is a very active and to a large extent Europeanised 
party in the EP politics. It has drafted common manifestos for all but the 1979 European elections, run 
increasingly EU-wide campaigns from 1984 to 2004, and sent more and more prestigious figures into 
the EP political stage. And with the rising electoral support and parliamentary representation, its 
political influence within an ever powerful EP has been strengthened and expanded, especially in 
certain committees or policy areas. As far as the policy-making participation is concerned, the EGP 
behaves increasingly like other Euro-parties with a low voting rate and a high party group cohesion, 
whereas there is rare cases indicating that it has independently determined the EP’s key decision (Hix 
1997:179). For instance, the Green MEPs did play an active role in disapproving and eventually 
censuring the Santer-led Commission, but it is hard to say that it is the Greens, or any other party, 
who has led to this result (Ruzza 2004:128; Hix 2006:chapter 10). 
The main finding from the foregoing analysis is that, by the end of the EP’s fifth term, the EGP has 
developed into a European party with a distinctive but normal ideology, a relatively well-organised 
organisation structure, and a quite professional and cooperative parliamentary participation. And as a 
result, it has reshaped itself dramatically and comprehensively compared with its early years in the EU 
politics. To this general conclusion, three points need to be added. First, the EGP’s realistic or 
pragmatic reorientation is neither a finished process ending with a unitary European Green ideology, 
nor one without having received any resistance from inside (Bomberg 2002:40). In fact, this process 
has posed a couple of crucial challenges for the EGP, putting it in an awkward predicament on many 
occasions, and the EGP still has to work hard to keep a subtle balance between policy achievements 
and green principles. Second, the EGP federation’s official position as the highest authority in 
politically guiding its constituent parts and supervising the Green group in the EP is weakened or 
vaporised by its lack of policy instruments and action capacities. In essence, the EGP federation has 
neither political power to determine the selection of candidates for the European election, nor binding 
means over the elected MEPs’ activities in the EP politics, thus starkly contrasting with the power 
structure of its member parties. A typical example in this aspect was provided by the Luxembourg 
Greens. It made a hotly controversial decision in the wake of 1999 European election to order all of its 
first six EP candidates to opt for the Chamber, while leaving the party’s sole EP seat to its seventh 
most popular candidate, Claude Turmes (Hearl 2001:51). This fact is a clear indication that how 
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relatively unimportant the Europolitics and the EP participation remain to be in the eyes of Green 
leaders at the national level. Finally, the EGP’s active participation in the EP politics does not imply 
that it can deliver many discernible policy achievements. As a small party, the EGP’s any realisable 
success very much depends upon its cooperation with the bigger Euro-parties and the compromises it 
can make. 
Table 3: Political participation of the EGP in the European Parliament (1979-2004) 
 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 
Electoral participation* 
Common 
manifestos - + + + + +/- 
EU-wide 
campaign - -/+ -/+ -/+ -/+ +/- 
Prestigious EP 
candidates - 0 23.8 (51.3) 38.1 (42.5) 31.6 (41.4) 45.7 (39.0) 
Representation participation** 
Votes(%) 2.42 (5) 4.25 (8) 7.39 (10) 5.67 (10) 7.72 (13) 7.28 (13) 
Seats 0 11 27 21 38 33 
Committee 
numbers 0 12 (3) 18 (6) 18 (4) 17 (4) 20 (5) 
Policy-making participation*** 
Voting rate(%) - 27 (38) 50 (48) 44 (48) n/a - 
Internal 
cohesion I (%) - 91 (92) 95 (92) 99 (95) n/a - 
Internal 
cohesion II (%) - 75 (79) 76 (75) 86 (80) 97 (89) - 
Impacts on 
EU-decisions - - - -/+ - - 
* prestigious candidates refer to the percentage of re-elected Green MEPs, and the bracketed is that in the EP. 
** votes refer to the average figures of the constituent members participating in elections have independently 
received, and the figures in bracket following committee members indicates the chair or vice chairs the EGP held 
at the beginning of the EP term. 
*** voting rate and internal cohesion I from Kreppel (2002), chapter 6, while internal cohesion II from Hix (2006), 
and the figures which follow in bracket indicate the averages for all the party groups in the EP. 
5. Roles and Limitations: Theoretical Explanations 
The previous analysis demonstrated that the EGP has evolved into a European political party in terms 
of programmatic development, organisational structure and political participation, though it is still a 
politically weak or distinct one, especially compared with the green parties at the national or regional 
level. This judgement to a large extent is a qualitative rather than quantitative one. And even in a 
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qualitative sense, one may draw a different conclusion about the EGP’s nature today from a different 
perspective. Both of Elizabeth Bomberg and Thomas Dietz have identified a process of 
‘Europeanisation’ of green parties at the European level, but denied that there has been a unitary or 
real European green party (Bomberg 2002:44-5; Dietz 2002:127-30). Furthermore, while Simon Hix 
and Christopher Lord argued that the transition from ‘nascent Euro-parties’ to ‘parties at the European 
level’ by the middle of the 1990s has not taken place (Hix and Lord 1997:197), Julie Smith stressed 
that the introduction of direct elections has not fostered a demonstrably transnational European party 
system by 1994 (Smith 1999:142). The real distinction between these scholars’ negative 
generalisation and the author’ positive one on the EGP’s characteristics lies in a methodological 
variance in explaining the developmental trajectory of a European green party. In the author’s 
understanding, the ‘Europeanisation’ of green parties and the formation of a European green party are 
two interwoven aspects of a progressive process. As a basis of this, the author argues that substantial 
changes with the EGP occurred since the mid-1990s have rendered it approaching a European party. 
Anyhow, with such a conceptualisation of the EGP, we can go further to discuss the questions as well 
as hypothesis 3 raised at the beginning of this article: what are the roles which the EGP as a weak 
Euro-party can play in an evolving European democracy? And are these roles improvable if certain 
conditions change with time? 
A logical inference is that a weak Euro-party will play some weak roles for a EU democracy. In the first 
place, the EGP can offer democracy and legitimacy in general for the EP as well as the EU polity, 
through participating in the European election and its presence at the EP. As a Euro-party, the EGP 
has developed its EU-relevant political programme, organisational structure and political participation, 
thus reflecting the forging political dimension of ‘materialism versus post-materialism’ at the European 
level. Owing in part to the EGP’s active involvement in the past two decades, the EU has dramatically 
expanded its jurisdiction and competence as well as democratic legitimacy to deal with the Green 
issues including environment protection and sustainable development. 
Secondly, the EGP can foster the formation and evolution of a European party system by 
strengthening the party competition in European electoral politics and parliamentary politics. On the 
one hand, great efforts have been made to increase the EGP’s ideological homogeneity and strategic 
harmony among its member parties and its MEPS in the EP to speed up the transition to a real Euro-
party. In many senses, the EGP has rapidly caught up with the other mainstream Euro-parties, shifting 
from a movement-style anti-system party to a professional parliamentary party. On the other hand, the 
EGP’s several pioneering measures in Europeanising its organisation structure, electoral manifesto 
and campaign strategy press for the other Euro-parties to follow. All these efforts are conducive to the 
development and consolidation of a European party system, a reliable basis for a EU democracy. 
Thirdly, the EGP can promote to shape a parliamentary democracy at the European level through its 
active though small-sized party group in the EP. On the one hand, most of the Green MEPs are adept 
in exploiting the opportunities offered by the EP membership to realise those achievable green policy 
goals, especially via active involvement in the parliamentary committees. On the other hand, for the 
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EGP including the Green group in the EP, propagating green percepts or educating the mainstream 
party politicians and the public is still regarded as one of its key missions, to promote the development 
of a public European space (Cohn-Bendit 2004). In the latter case, the EGP plays a classic function 
for political party, being a linkage of the people and the EU. And undoubtedly, this function of political 
parties is of crucial significance for a EU democracy in particular, given that it is still plagued with the 
serious problem of ‘democratic deficits’ (Pogge 1998:160-1). 
It is also clear that the EGP’s contribution for a EU democracy is extremely limited. While applying the 
general understandings to democracy into the continuum of ‘Euro-party—European election—EU 
polity’, one can easily find that there still lacks of a strong or even clear connection between them such 
as that at the national level. The EGP pursuing a common electoral manifesto, concerted campaign 
strategy and organisation has to adapt to the European election contesting around national issues, 
national party competition and nation-wide campaigns (EGP 2004b). It has almost no influence on the 
selection of candidates for the EP, and consequently has no substantive control over those who are 
elected (Kreppel 2002:206). In other words, the Green candidates or MEPs are essentially responsible 
for the EGP’s constituent parts rather than for itself. In fact, other than drafting and approving a 
common manifesto, the EGP has little to do with the European election—‘second-order national 
contests’ (Hix 1999:180). And as a result, similar with the other Euro-parties, the EGP’s campaign for 
the EP election to a great degree remains to be a collection of several national events. 
On the other side, within the EU institutional framework, the EP was historically disposed as a 
‘supplementary actor’ in European legislation and decision-making. Under such a structure, the major 
mission for the EP appeared to summon democracy or legitimacy for the legislation and decision-
making made by the other EU institutions, the Council and the EC especially, rather than to make the 
EU’s legislation and decision-making democratically. It is true that the increasingly powerful EP has 
mitigated the intension caused by this uneven power structure. However, the EP is still the weak 
partner in the legislative triumvirate of the EU (Kreppel 2002:89). Until the EP become an independent 
or sole legislator and capable supervisor for the EU governance, this indirectly democratic structure 
will arguably not be replaced by a directly democratic one, namely, from a regional integration 
organisation to a EU democracy (Smith 1999:149). One of the main victims for a weak EP is the slow 
development of Euro-parties and a European party system, and the small parties like the Greens 
suffers from it most. For the European election, the Euro-parties confront huge difficulties in 
persuading their powerful member parties to take it seriously and the lukewarm public to pay more 
attention to it. As has shown earlier, the EGP performs in a much more ‘Europeanised’ manner than 
the other Euro-parties, but its Europe-oriented electoral strategy is not always successful. In the EP, in 
order to vie with the political rivals for more powers, the Euro-parties are encouraged to reach a 
consensus or absolute majority decision on the issues in question, institutionally and procedurally. 
Two outcomes are then predictable. One is that the EP will inproportionally prefer and focus on those 
issues without disputes among the big Euro-parties. That means, many controversial but significant 
issues and/or radical but realisable solutions to them will be marginalised in the EP politics. The other 
one is that there will be actually a hegemony of the big two Euro-parties over the EP’s major powers, 
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and consequently there is only a small space left for the small parties (Kreppel 2002:216-7). For many 
years, it has been a custom for the ‘big-two’ to make a deal through exchanging their mutual support 
to determine who will be the president of the EP. Such a pattern of political practice and culture 
discriminating against political debate and party competition in the EP constricts strongly the functions 
which the small parties like the EGP otherwise can play. 
In application the institutional development theory into explaining the Euro-parties’ political 
performance, as Amie Kreppel has emphasised (Kreppel 2002:50-1), both macro and micro factors 
are relevant. As far as the EGP is concerned, it confronts both the internal and external constraints. 
Relatively radical ideology and loose organisation structure were, and still are, the primary constricting 
factors from inside, while the European electoral system and the EP’s status within a larger EU polity 
are the ones from outside, and it is obvious that the latter play a more influential part than the former in 
determining the EGP’s political functions as a Euro-party. In other words, ‘Europeanisation’ of the EGP 
thus far appears more like a process of adapting to the current rules of the EU, rather than a process 
of reorienting the EU polity to a democracy (Bomberg 2002). The EGP has done a lot to adjust itself to 
the requirements as a Euro-party, strategically and organisationally, but could do little to redefine the 
nature of the EP and the EU polity as a whole. 
This is by no means to say that the EGP as well as the other Euro-parties is demonstrably 
impotent in promoting the EU’s democratic transformation or the future of a EU democracy is doomed 
to be a failure (Schmitter 1998:13). First, reforming the EU’ institutional framework is still moving on, 
though slowly and sometimes with setbacks. Granting the EP more powers remains the dominant 
thinking among the European political elites to resolve the problem of ‘democratic deficits’ (van der 
Eijk and Franklin 1994:377). That implies, there is still a huge ‘political space’ in the EU for the Euro-
parties to exploit. Moreover, for a EU democracy, what the EP needs is not only more powers to make 
legislation independently and counterbalance the other EU institutions, but a better role to play in 
linking the people and the EU (Smith 1999:153). The fact that the French and Dutch voters rejected 
the constitution treaty in 2005, in the author’s opinion, is a clear message from the public for more and 
real democracy in the EU rather than less and pseudo. This means, the EP should pay more attention 
to act as a guarantee for the European citizens’ voices to be heard and deliberated instead of just as 
an aggressive power seeker. The Euro-parties, especially the EGP, can contribute a lot in this respect 
through electoral and parliamentary participation. 
Second, with the big Euro-parties’ attitude towards the EU and behaviour in the EP change, the EGP 
can play a better role in a more benign environment. Positive signs for such shifts include that a new 
‘left-right’ dimension is emerging in the EU policy process (Hix 1999:361), and a more competitive 
decision-making mechanism and political culture is also developing within the EP (Kreppel 2002:102). 
All these elements contribute to an evolutionary but far-reaching change with the EP party politics, and 
they can be stimulated further by introducing institutional reforms such as a EU-funded European 
election (van der Eijk and Franklin 1994:382), direct election of the EC president by the public and a 
simple majority of those in attendance in the EP votes (Hix and Lord 1997:216), a concerted media 
Arbei tspapiere -  Mannheimer  Zentrum für  Europäische Sozia l forschung  96  
 - 24 -
campaign actively supported by politicians (Smith 1999:153), and granting the EP substantial power in 
selecting candidates for European election or nominating candidate for the EC president (EGP 
2004b), etc. Undoubtedly, the big Euro-parties are the dominant actors in this process, and can do 
much more than they did, if they will. Because of this, one of the major functions for the EGP is to 
attract or press for the big Euro-parties to initiate these reforms quickly through its creative 
participation in the EP, a seemingly second-order but absolutely necessary role for a EU democracy. 
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